



SCHOLARSHIP

MODERNITY AND THE CHIEFTAIN CONTINUUM

MARK JARZOMBEK




Image: Marc Riboud, Cappadocia, near Urgup, Turkey, 1955. Photo: Magnum Photos New York



Mark Jarzombek is professor of the history and theory of architecture at MIT, former director of their Ph.D. program and also former interim dean of the School of Architecture and Planning. He works on a wide range of topics—both historical and theoretical—from the Renaissance to Hegel to the longhouses of Borneo. He is one of the country's leading advocates for global history and has published several books and articles on that topic including the ground-breaking textbook, *A Global History of Architecture* (Wiley Press) now in its third edition, with co-author Vikramaditya Prakash and with the noted illustrator Francis D. K. Ching. He is the sole author of *Architecture of First Societies: A Global Perspective* (Wiley Press, 2013). At various stages of his career, Jarzombek was a CASVA fellow, a post-doctoral resident fellow at the J. Paul Getty Center for the History of Humanities and Art, Santa Monica, California, a fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ, at the Canadian Center for Architecture, and at the Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute. This spring he will be a fellow at the American Academy in Rome.

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ABSTRACT

This article takes a long view of the chieftain continuum of the first millennium CE. I argue that it was only in the centuries leading to the end of the first millennium CE that chieftain cultures created for themselves a larger, global profile, larger in territory and wealth than the proverbial civilizations that had traditionally been centered around the Mediterranean, in Mesopotamia, northern India, the north and east coast of China, and in parts of the Americas. Most remarkably, as the world's city-based empires focused on ecological zones that could support grain surpluses, chieftain cultures came to control a wide variety of ecological zones. They were the masters of the savannah, tundra, steppe, plains, oceans, mountains, and rain forests. They became masters not just because of their intrinsic familiarity with their native landscape, but because the chieftain world—when one thinks of it as a larger formation—had become the world's primary supplier of luxury goods. It can be difficult to imagine the importance that was played by unmanufactured commodities such as ivory, gems, spices, camphor, amber, scented woods, and even animals in the world before colonialism and the era of manufactured commodification. We can also forget that all these commodities were, at their source, under the direct control of people in the chieftain continuum. Even though the initial product in a sense came from nature itself, in no case was it free for the taking, in the sense of John Locke. Local tribes and chieftains monopolized resources and knew the appropriate natural and spirit-world rhythms that allowed their acquisition. Since the history of trade is usually one that looks at goods traveling toward the great urban centers, we tend to forget the value of trade moving in the other direction, in the great give-and-take between the chieftain world and civilization.

In the article, I explore a more balanced accounting of these exchanges. The last 300 years have not been favorable for that chieftain world, and not just because of the horrific decimations brought on by disease and

colonialism, and not just because of the advances of so-called Western secularism. Modernization, nationalization, monotheismization, and assimilation, whether forced or unforced, all played a part in depriving the chieftain world of its place in the geo-political system of wealth production. And yet the residual but persistent energy of the chieftain world is not hard to find. In fact, the more one looks, the more one realizes that the global presence of the chieftain world—though missing, mangled, and often still much maligned—brings into visibility modernity's historical, political, and conceptual limits. It is the "optic" that allows us to comprehend the geo-political, unnaturalness of modernity, for it produces an agonism that now more than ever has no clear end in sight.

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In the early 1940s when Uncle Billy was a little boy, he ran into Living Solid Face in the woods about Piscataway Creek. Covered by brush, the guardian spirit resided on a large boulder over the tributary of the Potomac River, only fifteen miles south of Washington, D.C. Grandpa Turkey decided to call the Smithsonian scholars from the Bureau of American Ethnology to the site so that it could be officially recorded that there was still an old Piscataway chieftain territory marker in modern times. When the scholars arrived, they debated about the boulder face's age. To resolve the academic question, they decided to have it removed for further study. They came back with workmen and a jackhammer. As they attempted to remove it, the face disintegrated to dust. Living Solid Face refused to be captured that day.¹

When we think of the modern world, the word chieftain does not come to mind as a key determinant of the conversation. But if we were to move the clock back by only a few centuries, the situation would have been markedly different. In the 16th century, the proverbial

civilizations of the world in China, India, Asia, North Africa, and Europe constituted a fraction of the global economic territory. Huge zones were under the control of chieftains of various sorts. In fact, had Europeans not risen to such dominance by the 19th century, the world today might not look all that much different from that of the 16th century. This is not to say that things would have remained static, but that the terms of modernity would have been significantly different. Today, the chieftain world that once so prospered—and that was still very much in play in some parts of the world, even into the 19th century—is for all practical purposes gone, beaten back not just by colonialism, but also by the combined globally scaled forces of monotheism, nationalism, modernization, weaponization, and, more recently, by the globalization of the various commodity industries and their internationally sanctioned resource appropriation. Without much of a written history of its own, the place of the chieftain world in our historical narratives is further sorely undervalued.

What do I mean by "chieftain"? The question is a trap, because anthropologists have identified so many variations. No doubt, *chiefdoms* at the upper end of the register have a well-structured, hierarchical organization, usually based on kinship, in which power and wealth were controlled by the senior members of select families or "houses," forming an aristocracy relative to the general group. The word "tribe" usually indicates something less structured. Instead of dividing and subdividing, I will cautiously move in the opposite direction of generality, using chieftain not as an anthropological term, but as a semiotic indicator of a way of knowing the world. It had certain attributes: kin relationships, orality, ancestor cults as well as strong attachments to nature spirits and mountain deities. And though we often emphasize the proverbial chief, this world had complex layers of ritual specialists, shamans, elders, and dream-interpreters, along with warriors, slaves, and transportation specialists, not to mention clan members of various sorts and ranks. It was this complexity and its elasticity—usually in the form of village networks—that enabled the chieftain world to develop and prosper for so long. Most remarkably, whereas the world's city-based empires had to focus on ecological zones that could support grain surplus, chieftain cultures could be found in a wide variety of ecological zones. They were the masters

of the savannah, tundra, steppe, plains, oceans, mountains, and rain forests as well as, of course, the rich assortment of foods that could be generated in these places.

And yet we know so much more about civilizations, associated as they usually are with the category state, because they held the keys to their *own* narrative in the form of writing; but any reasoned understanding of history can show that the absence of historical records should not lead us to see absence itself. "At one time in human prehistory, chiefdoms were the most complex of all human social organizations."² The author is referring to the Neolithic period in Europe around 3,000 BCE, but the irony is that the chieftain world did not shrink in size with the arrival of so-called "historical" cultures. On the contrary, it thrived. In the 13th century CE, and even perhaps well into the 17th century, there were significantly more "prehistorical" people on the planet than "historical" ones, but one would hardly get a sense of this from civilization-centric histories.

From that perspective, one also misses a rather remarkable historical dynamic, for the issue here is not the proverbial encounter between civilizations and the chieftain societies at their periphery, but the difference in regard to the scale of the chieftain world between the beginning of the first millennium CE and its end. In the first century CE, huge amounts of global territory were either still empty or only lightly populated by First Society people. A thousand years later, by the 13th century, the chieftain world had filled out many of these areas (Figure 1). Where once there had been little in the way of a social footprint, there were now vast arrays of village networks, chiefdoms, and chiefdom-derived kingdoms. By the 13th century, chiefdoms had even redefined the core identity of civilizational DNA. The once terrifying Normans were kings of England; the Mongolians were rulers of China; a former Viking territory was now known as the Grand Duchy of Moscow; and the fearsome Huns were the proud sovereigns of the Kingdom of Hungary. Former Mongolian slaves, the Mamluks, ruled Egypt. If we add the kingdoms in southeast Asia, the Bantu in Africa, the Polynesians in the Pacific, the Mississippi Mound cultures in the Americas, and the rain forest cultures in the Amazon Basin, to name only a few of the dominant chiefdoms and chiefdom-descendent societies, we




Figure 1: History of dechieftanization from 200,000 BCE - 2,000 CE
 Courtesy: Author

begin to get a sense of the enormous scale of the chieftain world at the end of the first millennium CE.

And yet if we tell the history of that period, we will inevitably talk about the Empires of Rome, Charlemagne, or Asoka; the various dynasties in China; the Rise of Islam, and so forth. The great tribal-chieftain continuum that filled out much of the rest of the world more or less disappears from textbooks except when it involves references to invasions. The problem of how to come to terms with this vast history is so profound that it shatters any untampered confidences in the disciplinary protocols of history.

We come now to the critical question. Why did the chieftain continuum expand so dramatically in the first millennium CE? Most scholars, when they talk about expansion, mention population growth, and sometimes the culture of budding and migration. As important as these may be, we should not overlook another key factor: luxury trade. Today, luxury commodities are almost all manufactured and engineered—a watch, an automobile, an airplane. Civilization produces its own luxury objects. Even gold and diamonds are industrial products. It is, therefore, difficult for us to imagine a world where large parts of the luxury economy were unmanufactured commodities, diamonds from the rivers of Borneo, scented woods from Southeast Asia, gold and slaves from Africa, furs from Siberia, pepper from Timor, turquoise from the American southwest, and on and on; the list is enormous. Until the arrival of the Europeans to these various parts of the world, these

luxury goods moved from tribes to more hierarchical chiefdoms to the various kingdoms and ports where they were then placed into the flow of global trade. As contact with distant civilizations increased, the desire economy emanating from the civilizational centers worked its way with increased potency upstream to even the farthest forests or shores. Though no one can really measure just how much of the global economic wealth was controlled by chieftains in the 16th century, at the beginning of the colonial period, a good starting position would be at least on the order of fifty percent by that time.

Somewhere between their source and their final use, most of the goods were crafted in some way, but the initial product was made by nature, so to speak. But in no case was it free for the taking in the sense of John Locke. Local tribes and chieftains monopolized resources and knew the appropriate natural, ancestral, spirit-world rhythms, and the related costs that allowed acquisition to take place. Take amber, for example, a commodity that stood at the apex of the Roman luxury market. With gold in short supply, since so much of it was used to purchase luxury goods from India, amber became a currency all unto its own. Though easy to mine along the shores of the Baltic Sea, its acquisition and delivery up the chain of command to the local chieftains was regulated through tightknit clan relations. There can be no doubt that the wealth it generated among the Baltic and German chiefdoms played an important role in strengthening the power of the chiefdoms there—with, of course, eventual negative consequences for the Romans. The Vikings, who came to control the amber trade a few centuries later, did even better. They learned that African elephant ivory was one of the most expensive luxury items in Europe, reserved almost exclusively for church bibles and sacred ornaments. With such a market, why not offer a cheaper substitute: walrus ivory? Who in Paris could possibly tell the difference? But walruses are not native to Scandinavia. The closest places were Iceland and Greenland, and the Vikings made a killing not just on pillaging, for which they are more famous, but in selling walrus ivory (Figure 2). In other words, the Vikings did not just rely on local sources of wealth, but colonized parts of the world to monopolize the niche market.³




Figure 2: Jedburgh comb made from a single piece of walrus ivory c. 1100 CE. Found in Jedburgh Abbey. The carving shows a man fighting a dragon. 5 cm wide by 4.34 cm long.
Courtesy: Christian Bickel

Long distance trade in lightweight luxury goods was even more important to the expanding world of Southeast Asia during the first millennium CE. The empires in India and China increasingly gorged themselves on the wealth coming out of the rain forests: cinnamon, pearls, diamonds, and bird's nests were just the better-known luxury commodities that also included rattan and the gall bladder of a long-tailed monkey (*Semnopithecus pruinosus*), known as bezoar stones. The Chinese court had a particularly strong taste for the iridescent blue feathers of the kingfisher bird, which were used as a crown ornament for the emperor or as an inlay for hairpins, headdresses, and fans for panels and screens (Figure 3). The most expensive commissioned pieces used feathers from a particular species of kingfisher from the forests of Cambodia. So great was the trade of these feathers that it was a major wealth-generating element for the Khmer, who used that wealth not just for their extravagant temples and palaces—show-off pieces in the regional stage, Angkor Wat being just one of them—but for the gold and silver that they in turn imported as architectural decoration. Who today thinks that one could trade gold for a few feathers? One of the several famous Chinese crowns that have survived into the modern era, such as the one worn by the Empress Dowager Xiaojie of the Ming Dynasty and exhibited in the National Museum in Beijing, was decorated with figurines of phoenixes, dragons, clouds and flowers using gold, azure kingfisher feathers, pearls and other



Figure 3: Chinese imperial queen's headdress (Ming Dynasty) with blue tiansui leaves and birds, gold dragons, pearls, and polished semi-precious stones. Located at the Ming tombs museum complex.
Courtesy: Leonard G.

precious stones. The gold probably came from Borneo, the feathers from Cambodia, and the pearls from either the Philippines or Sri Lanka. Trade in bezoar stones existed well into the late 19th century, when an English naturalist and adventurer in Borneo noted with some astonishment:

A curious industry is the collection of galiga, or bezoar stones, which are also mostly secured by the Orang Poonan [Borneo's forest tribes]. These galiga are highly prized for medicinal purposes, and are sold at fabulous prices to the Boegis [Celebe traders from Sulawesi who settled in Koetei], who resell them to the Chinese.⁴

Also from Borneo, even as late as 1911, Chinese merchants would buy a pound and half of crystalized camphor, valued by the elites for its medicinal and aphrodisiac properties, for two ounces of gold, roughly equivalent to \$50 dollars.⁵ One can only imagine its even higher "palace-value cost" in China.⁶

There is an important dynamic in all of this that the banal world 'trade' fails to convey. The chieftain world needed its own type of oil in the system, one that is, however, extremely hard to document given that we are discussing oral cultures. A good deal of the upstreaming of wealth—often ignored by historians of "trade"—

went into the clan network. The chieftain elites also needed goods for the obligatory ritual exchanges and feasts, and for the construction of the aura of prestige itself. They needed mortuary shrines and in some cases, temples. Many goods were deposited in lakes and streams as gifts to guardian spirits and ancestors where they obviously remain invisible to history. By the 12th century or so, this exchange system had become so robust that both sides needed the other.

At the core of this exchange was an important asymmetry. If "natural" items went downstream, it was often manufactured goods that went upstream, valued not simply for their practical uses, but as prestige commodities. In the civilizational centers, manufactured goods could be easily produced in surplus for the explicit purpose of trade: bronze caldrons, beads, silver beakers, weapons, and cloth. The Chinese of course had silk and bronze. On December 29, 1378, Chinese records indicate that envoys from Pahang, an entity on peninsular Malaysia, arrived with a set of typical Southeast Asian gifts including frankincense from Yemen, as well as camphor and red (proboscis) monkeys from Borneo (Figure 4). In return, the envoys received "patterned fine silk."⁷ Romans exchanged wine, the liquid equivalent of silk in terms of civilizational effort, for iron bars. Celtic iron was of course made through a process akin to industrialization, but the Celts did not make finished weapons for the Romans. Furthermore, the smithing of metal in local workshops hardly compares with the labor and land policies necessary for wine cultivation. Examples are numerous. When Europeans showed up in the Americas, they often exchanged axes and liquor for animal hides. Vikings traded their amber, slaves, and walrus tusks for, among other things, silver, coins, fine fabrics, silk, and wine. Forest chiefs of Sri Lanka exchanged the rubies they panned in the mountain rivers—and that were destined to be one of the cornerstones of Indian luxury—for rice that was grown by the valley kingdoms partially for just such trade.

One of the reasons the chieftain supply chain prospered was because of the fundamental *inefficiency* of states to master anything other than a rather small zone of ecological reality. The civilizational powers before the era of colonialization did not have the wherewithal to get to the source of most of the luxury goods they



Figure 4: Traditional Camphor extraction in Taiwan
Courtesy: National Taiwan Museum.

wanted. A civilization-centric history will thus fail to recognize the systemic *inability* of urban-based empires to handle mountains, forests, steppes, deserts, and oceans, the natural habitat—and vast it was—for the tribal-chieftain world. Stated differently, the states of the first millennium CE were incapable of dealing with the world outside of the Holocene norm that privileged a taxable mixture of agriculture, crafts, and resource acquisition. Civilizations stayed away from zones that were too hot, too dry, too wet. The genius of the chieftain world, by way of contrast, was the claim it made to *non-normative environments*. There is a direct relationship between civilization's inability to transcend its ecological zones and the escalating value in the first millennium CE of exotic luxury items from distant shores.

The chieftain world's capacity to master difficult ecologies, a capacity that constituted its bulwark against civilizational encroachment, would be challenged first by European colonialists and then by the escalating forces of industrialization. Before then, the chieftain world had specialized in the extreme landscape conditions that are so typical of much of the globe's surface (Figure 5). Those chieftain cultures that lived in the boundary conditions with civilizations came to be locked into the systems of exchange that flowed through them. Instability was a guarantee, with raids and counter-raids marking the entire history along the contact zone. Inevitably, contact zone chiefdoms had to imperialize or tribalize. They had to match force with force, or be subsumed by those who could.




Figure 5: The mastery of extreme landscape by Chieftain world
 Courtesy: Author

For example, no sooner had the English arrived in Jamestown than the various small cultural units in the area, despite the fact that they were linguistically and culturally diverse, united into a powerful chiefdom—the Powhatan Confederacy, as it is now mostly called—under the control of a *Mamanatowick*, which has been translated variously as “paramount chief” or “emperor,” but which really means something like “powerful spiritual presence.” He was attended by various servants and shamans as well as a fifty-man bodyguard. Though he controlled the chiefs or leaders (*weroance* lit: “rich and esteemed”), he embodied different roles. The soldiers represented his military voice, whereas the shamans, his power and right to contact the ancestors. English and European colonialists could never quite understand what to them seemed like a particularly inefficient way to govern. This was because the *Mamanatowick* was not a ruler in the European sense, but an expediency in troubled times. He was in charge of the distribution of maize through tribute payments, community labor and domestic production. This allowed him to quickly mobilize an army.⁸ The English also did not realize that it was their presence that created this system. This partially explains why historically, chiefdoms that survived the longest rose to prominence well outside of civilizational force-fields, proliferating in other words in southern Africa, Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands and in parts of the Americas.

The last 300 years, of course, saw the denouement of this whole system. The obliteration of the chieftain continuum was not caused by some natural transition to a superior form of governance, but by a concerted effort of de-chieftainization. A key factor was the need to appropriate the sources of wealth. It was a globally-scaled, multi-institutional, multi-century project: death by a thousand cuts. The Dutch took away the diamond fields in Borneo to make Amsterdam the new global center for the diamond market. In the Americas, the white colonizers

killed off the buffalo to drive the Plains Indians from the land. In South Africa, the Dutch and English took the gold mines. Ivory trade is now banned, and natural camphor, one of the leading luxury items brought out of Borneo, was replaced by a manufactured product. Coins have replaced beads, shells, and amber. The unrelenting deforestations in Brazil, Indonesia, and Borneo continue to have the easily predicted side effect: the de-population of the landscape. Machines of almost unimaginable scale have made even the most inhospitable landscape cough up its wealth. Gold is no longer panned along forest rivers, but is instead industrially mined and shipped. Monotheism played a huge role in disconnecting locals from ancestral cults. This form of de-chieftainization is hardly over. It is still preached by Christian and Islamic fundamentalists whose efforts are often directly associated with the politics of nationalization and modernization. I need only refer here to the Joshua Project or to Wahhabism. But most importantly, wealth is no longer generated from “exotic” natural goods, but from manufactured goods. In 1954, Peter Abrahams, the renowned South African novelist, phrased the drive toward modernization with the following words: “The moral codes of tribal man were adequate to his time. The needs of modern man, the conditions under which modern man lives, demand new structures and new values.”⁹ Nothing could better summarize the civilizational arrogance of the modernist mindset.

But the chieftain world refused, and still refuses, to just go away, forcing the matrixes of civilization to perfect the conspiratorial strategy of stabilizing the rough encounter with its former economic partners to its advantage, and always with an eye to the eventual demise of chieftain sensibilities. The classic way in which chieftain cultures were tamed—apart, of course, from disease and conquest—was to convert polities into tribes, a word that inevitably connotes an administrative problem rather than a societal shaping of the world.¹⁰ As Kenyan writer Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o has pointed out with wry poignancy, "[E]very African community is a tribe, and every African a tribesman, meaning that thirty million Yorubas are referred to as a tribe, but four million Danes as a nation."¹¹ Another way was to translate former chieftain people into "ethnic groups."¹² In some cases, communities uphold "traditional" life-styles and are even occasionally protected by the cultural elites when it suits national imperatives. But from an economic point of view, the role of former chieftain communities in the great, global flow of luxury commodities is zero, making it hard for us even to imagine what a prosperous chieftain world once looked like.

And yet, the residual but persistent energy of the chieftain world is not hard to find.¹³ I live, for example, in the state of Massachusetts, named arbitrarily after

one of dozens of former regional chiefdoms that have long since ceased to exist. Chieftain imaginaries are continuously evoked, heroically and even nostalgically, in cinema, such as in *Avatar*; in sports, such as the Kansas City Chiefs; or in avant-gardist art. Somewhere in all of this, one would have to mention the increasingly formidable cultural space of Contemporary Neo-Paganism, which has been defined as "a collection of modern religious, spiritual, and magical traditions that are self-consciously inspired by the pre-Judaic, pre-Christian, and pre-Islamic belief systems of Europe, North Africa, and the Near East"¹⁴ (Figure 6). It has strong parallels with Neo-shamanism, a movement in its own right, especially in Eastern Asia and South America. And in Peru, the Pachamama cult—as a combination of survival, revival, and New Age Mysticism—is experiencing a pronounced popularity. These are not just curiosities and fads, but part of sustained critiques against the conspiratorial teleology of "civilization."

The chieftain world, with all its gray zones, has to be seen not as something *before* modernism, but as *integral* to the modern world and its history, even if this history wants nothing more even today than to finish the job. But now that the inconclusiveness of that project is apparent, modernity, once seen as a set of irreversible universalizations (nation, religion,



Figure 6a: A Rumuvan ceremony, probably photographed in Lithuania, reviving the pagan religious practices of Baltic people before their Christianization in 1387. Courtesy: Mantas LT



Figure 6b: Neo-Paganism in Sweden. Heathen altar with large wooden idol of god Freyr, associated with Nordic mythology. Courtesy: Gunnar Creutz

culture, language, modernization, government, and even, but most importantly, civilization) has been forced to retrench itself into a compromise position with the ancient chieftain world that, in various types of translations, resides at multiple institutionalized, cultural, and psycho-cultural registers *within* modernity. Modernity, from that perspective, is not some "unfinished" project, but stuck in an asymptotic position in its relationship with the chieftain past. It has stripped the chieftain world bare of its economic and political purpose, but has not succeeded in equal terms in regards to culture. In some contexts, that past survives in a type of political "old-age home," awaiting its eventual termination in the quietude of assimilation and structural forgetfulness. In other places, it survives as an uneasy, inter-political, marginalized alliance with centralized authority, or as a curiosity among the great nation states; and yet in other places, it is being

vigorously reformatted into the welcoming embrace of ethno-centrism, tourism, and nostalgia (Figure 7). And finally, in some places it carries the label "terrorists" and embodies the cult of resistance. So instead of seeing the chieftain world as a residual "peripheral" to modernity, or as some historical (anthropological) "pre-modern," or as something that can be conveniently packaged in the form of tradition, we can see how it brings into visibility modernity's historical, political, and conceptual limits. The chieftain world is the *optic* that allows us to comprehend the geo-political unnaturalness of modernity, producing an agonism that has no clear end in sight. ■



Figure 7: 2017 fashion shoot of a model dressed in Native American tribal chief clothing
 Courtesy: Public Domain, photographer unknown

ENDNOTES

1. Gabrielle Taya, "Keeping the Original Instructions," *Native Universe: Voices of Indian America*, edited by Gerald McMaster, Clifford E. Trafzer (Washington, D.C.: National Geographic, 2008) 73-83 [p. 82].
2. Yamilette Chacon, *The Contribution of Status Lineages in the Rise of the State: A New Theory of State Formation*, (Dissertation in the Department of Sociology, University of South Carolina, 2014), 9.
3. Bastiaan Star, James H. Barrett, Agata T. Gondek, Sanne Boessenkool, "Ancient DNA reveals the chronology of walrus ivory trade from Norse Greenland," *Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences* (Published 8 August 2018. DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2018.0978). Historians know that the about forty tusks payed the equivalent to a year's worth of tax to the king of Norway, for a clan. That is twenty animals that one clobbers to death on the beach, not hard to do.
4. Carl Bock, *Headhunters of Borneo, A Narrative of Travel up the Mahakkam and Down the Barito* (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, 1882), 205.
5. Edwin Herbert Gomes, *Seventeen Years Among the Sea Dyaks of Borneo: A Record of Intimate Association with the Natives of the Bornean Jungles* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1911), 239.
6. It was so precious that in the early 18th century, the camphor trees in Formosa—now Taiwan—were owned by the Chinese state and the penalty for chopping one of them down was nothing less than death. "The Camphor Industry," *Meyer Brothers Druggist* 22/2 (1901), 51. See also: Mark Jarzombek, "Borneo: The River Effect and the Spirit World Millionaires" in *A History of Architecture and Trade*, edited by Patrick Haughey (London: Routledge, 2018), 80-114.
7. Geoff Wade, translator, *Southeast Asia in the Ming Shi-lu: an open access resource*, (Singapore: Asia Research Institute and the Singapore E-Press, National University of Singapore, 2017), <http://www.epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/reign/hong-wu/year-11-month-12-day-9>, accessed July 23, 2017.
8. The above is condensed from: Jayme A. Sokolow, *The Great Encounter: Native Peoples and European Settlers in Americas, 1492-1800* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 86; Helen C. Rountree, *The Powhatan Indians of Virginia: Their Traditional Culture* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), 114.

9. Peter Abrahams, "The Conflict of Culture in Africa," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs)* 30/3 (July 1954), 304-2, [p. 312].

10. See for example: Virginius Xaxa, "Tribes as Indigenous People of India," *Economic and Political Weekly*, 34/51 (Dec. 1999), 18-24. According to Peter Berger, the use of terms like "tribe" and "tribal" is not even clear among anthropologists. Some would prefer not to use either or only within "inverted commas." See Peter Berger, "Feeding Gods, Feeding Guests: Sacrifice and Hospitality among the Gadaba of Highland Orissa," *Anthropos*, 106/1 (2011), 31-47.

11. Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, "The Myth of Tribe in African Politics," *Transition*, Vol. 101, No.1. 16-23, [p. 17].

12. Leonard M. Helfgott, "Tribalism as a Socioeconomic Formation in Iranian History," *Iranian Studies*, 10/ 1-2 (Winter-Spring, 1977), 36-61, [p. 36].

13. The last time Robert Carmack uses the word "tribe" in his otherwise excellent book *Anthropology and Global History, from Tribes to the Modern World-System* (2015) is on page 128 in a book that is about 360 pages long. The implication is that "tribality" has been phased out of the modern world-system.

14. Ethan Doyle White, *Wicca: History, Belief, and Community in Modern Pagan Witchcraft* (Brighton, Chicago, and Toronto: Sussex Academic Press. 2016), 6.